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Abstract:  The recent explosion in personal bankruptcy filings has motivated research into
whether credit markets are being adversely affected by generous legal provisions.  Empirically,
this question is examined by comparing credit conditions and bankruptcy exemptions across
states. We note that the literature has focused on aggregate household credit, making no
distinction between secured and unsecured credit.  We argue that such aggregation obscures
important differences in forms of credit.  Most significantly, property exemptions do not
prevent the home mortgage creditor from foreclosing on the home if not fully repaid.  This
makes it unlikely that the home mortgage lender will be adversely affected by the exemptions.
We argue further that some property exemptions may in fact have some beneficial effects for
home mortgage lenders.  Using both household-level data and state-level data, we show that
in the 1990's high exemption levels have not tended to increase mortgage rates or increase the
probability of being denied a mortgage.
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1.  Introduction
Personal bankruptcy is no longer an unusual phenomenon. Personal bankruptcy filings
have risen over 500% in the last two decades and there were over 1 million filings in 1996
alone.   Moreover, these filing statistics may in fact understate the importance of personal
1
bankruptcy as many more debtors may implicitly use the threat of filing to evade collection
efforts by their creditors; it is default and not necessarily bankruptcy which creates losses for
creditors (see White and Petropolous (1996)). 
The possibility that these changes in bankruptcy patterns may affect the larger market for
credit is of obvious importance to economists and the general public.   Yet, to date there has
been surprisingly little research in this area.  In one recent exception, Gropp Scholz and White
(1997) used the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finance to test the question of whether differences in
state bankruptcy exemption levels affect aggregate household credit.
Aggregate household credit, though, contains both secured and unsecured credit which
have very different dispositions in bankruptcy.  As a result, the effects of bankruptcy exemptions
on aggregate credit may obscure important differences in the underlying components of
household credit.  In this paper, we argue that much of the conventional wisdom regarding
bankruptcy does not apply to secured credit.  In particular, we focus on the primary market for
household credit -- the market for mortgage loans. 
Mortgage loans are (nearly always) fully secured by a combination of collateral,
downpayment and mortgage insurance. Over 97% of the secured claims of Savings and Loans
and private mortgage companies on bankrupt debtors are fully secured (Sullivan, Warren andAs a consequence, while losses on personal loans amounted
2
to about 2% of total, losses on second mortgages were only 0.2%
in 1992 (Installment Credit Report (1992)).
See Kennickell, Starr-McCluer and Sunden (1997).
3
Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook (1989) report that 10% of
4
homeowners in bankruptcy do not even report their mortgages to
the court.  They estimate that 40% of debtors in bankruptcy
reaffirm some form of secured debt.
3
Westbrook (1989).   The mortgage lender has an important legal remedy unavailable to other
2
creditors, namely the right to foreclose on the home.  The mortgage lender is senior to
bankruptcy exemptions with respect to its collateral.
In addition to approximating fully secured credit, mortgage debt plays a central role in
the portfolio of many households. Home mortgage loans represented 68% of the liabilities of
households in 1995.   Mortgage loans are also prominent in bankruptcy; in a sample studied by
3
Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook (1989), 53% of bankrupt debtors were homeowners and, in this
group, mortgage loans constitute more than half of their debts. 
Below we provide a significantly more detailed examination of the bankruptcy provisions
and their relationship to secured credit than typically found in the existing literature.  We include
this discussion because it is our focus on the institutional arrangements which leads us to
different conclusions than those of Gropp Scholz and White (1997).
In particular, the role of the home as collateral and the existence of several legal
protections provided to the home mortgage lender in bankruptcy make it unlikely that homestead
exemptions could adversely affect the mortgage credit market.  In addition, it is possible that the
home mortgage lender may gain from these exemptions and bankruptcy.  Put simply, many
debtors file for bankruptcy precisely so that they can pay their mortgage and keep their home by
discharging other debts.
4
Our empirical investigation makes use of both time series and cross-sectional variation. For example, a bankrupt debtor in Maryland may only use a
5
$5,500 wildcard exemption to try to keep both his car and his
house under Chapter 7.  In Texas, a bankrupt debtor may exempt
his home regardless of its value as long as it is on a lot of
less than one acre (200 acres if outside a municipality) and
could potentially exempt automobiles worth $60,000.  Exemptions
cover objects as diverse as a leased organ (Delaware) to dead
bodies (Rhode Island).
Most of these studies did not address the fact that the
6
exemptions have legal significance both in and out of bankruptcy. 
We argue below that, despite this oversight, the hypothesis may
still be valid.
-4-
The Home Mortgage Discrimination Act (HMDA) dataset and the Federal Housing Finance
Board's Rates and Terms on Conventional Home Mortgages provide cross-sectional data over
several years.  To our knowledge, this paper is the first to use these large high-quality data sets
to study of the effects of bankruptcy.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief outline of the
relevant empirical evidence.  Section 3 discusses some aspects of the legal structure of the credit
market and some limits to pre-bankruptcy planning.  Section 4 presents a framework for
examining the effects of property exemptions on the supply of mortgages.  Section 5 reports
empirical estimates of the importance of exemption levels on the market for housing credit. 
Section 6 concludes.
2. Existing Evidence
Although bankruptcy is governed by federal law, the states are permitted to set their own
exemption policies and have been kind to empirical economists by enacting what seems to be
wildly different exemption policies.   Several authors have tested the hypotheses that, by making
5
bankruptcy more attractive, large exemptions should lead to an increase in the filing rate.  
6
White (1987) finds a positive relationship between the size of a state's exemption and theGSW use interest rates from auto loans.  These loans are
7
often undersecured in bankruptcy, so their interest rate measure
reflects both secured and unsecured credit components.
-5-
number of filings that was statistically significant, but weak.  Many other scholars find either no
statistically significant relationship or even a negative relationship between the generosity of a
state's exemption and the number of filings (e.g., Peterson and Aoki (1984), Shiers and
Williamson (1987) and Buckley and Brinig (1996)).  Hynes (1998) finds that this ambiguity is
not resolved by examining panel-data or the quasi-experiment created by the change in the
federal exemptions in 1994.
A recent article by Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) (GSW) uses the 1983 Survey of
Consumer Finance to test the broader question of whether differences in states' bankruptcy
exemption levels affect aggregate household credit (both secured and unsecured).  They find that
exemption differentials are having a significant effect (see Domowitz and Eovaldi (1993) for
opposing arguments).  Specifically, GSW find that, when controlling for other factors, relatively
large state bankruptcy exemptions are associated with 1) higher probabilities of being denied
credit and 2) higher interest rates on automobile loans for low-asset households.  Clearly, the
GSW paper raises some very important questions.  
GSW study the effect of different exemption levels on the probability of being denied
credit regardless of whether the credit is secured or unsecured.  The Survey of Consumer
Finance asks whether the debtor has been denied credit, not whether this credit was secured or
unsecured (see Avery, Ellihausen  and Kennickell (1988)).  Similarly, the quantity of credit and
interest rate variables which they examine also aggregate these two kinds of credit.   This
7
assumption is justified by the debtor's ability to "arbitrage assets and debts across categories." 
The authors suggest that debtors could borrow on their credit cards or obtain a new consumer
loan in order to reduce their mortgage.  While some debtors certainly do so, this kind of strategy
is risky and, as detailed below, there are very real limits to this strategy.  More importantly, this-6-
strategy prejudices the unsecured creditor in favor of the secured creditor.  A successful
execution of the strategy results in the mortgage holder getting paid while the unsecured creditor
bears the loss.  
Secured debt and, in particular, mortgage debt is granted very different legal treatment
than unsecured debt in bankruptcy.  Aggregating these two forms of credit may obscure
differential responses to the prospect of bankruptcy.  This paper focuses on home mortgages; the
effect on unsecured loans is left to future work.  In the next section, we provide detailed
background on the treatment of mortgage and unsecured debt in bankruptcy.
3. Credit Demand and the Bankruptcy Exemptions Laws
While most states require their debtors to use the state property exemptions, other states
allow debtors to choose the federal section 522(d) exemptions.  Exemptions protect the assets of
a debtor from seizure by creditors.  Therefore, this paper considers both the §522(d) bankruptcy
exemptions and state property exemptions.  If a debtor files under Chapter 7, he will be entitled
to exempt the equity in his assets up to the value specified in the exemptions.  The exemptions
may also have significance in Chapter 13 through the “best interests of the creditors” test which
states that the creditors are entitled to receive at least as much in Chapter 13 as they would have
received in Chapter 7 (section 1325(a)(4) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code).  Finally, most state
exemptions protect the assets of a debtor even if he does not file for bankruptcy.
3a. The Characteristics of Property Exemptions
Empirical investigations would be much easier if the variation between state property
exemptions was based solely on generosity; for example if all states enacted exemptions which
allowed the debtor to choose the form of exempt property.  Almost half of the states do provide
a “wildcard” exemption which allows a debtor to choose at least some of his exemption andA "wildcard" exemption is available in 24 states and the
8
District of Columbia.  However, in 18 of these states the
exemption is below $1,000.
-7-
some states have “spillover” provisions in their homestead exemption which allows a debtor
without a home to use some of the homestead exemption for other purposes.   However, even in
8
these states the “wildcard” or “spillover” exemptions are but one of many exemptions available
to the debtor.
A homestead exemption allows a debtor to exempt the equity in his home and is typically
the most generous property exemption available.  Despite popular belief, no homestead
exemption is truly "unlimited."  Those that do not contain a dollar limit contain a limit on the lot
size.  Although some of these limits are quite large for rural areas, it is quite easy to imagine that
the limitation becomes binding for wealthier debtors in towns, cities or villages.  For example, in
Arkansas a debtor claiming an exemption in a city, town or village can obtain an unlimited
exemption only if his homestead is under 1/4 of an acre.  If the homestead is between 1/4 and 1
acre, the homestead exemption is limited to $2,500.  No homestead may exceed 1 acre in a city,
town or village.  Apparently those debtors owning more than 1 acre in the town must choose the
second option of up to $1,250 in equity if married; an amount which is not scandalously large. 
Of course, a home on 1/4 of an acre may still be worth quite a bit and many of the homestead
exemptions, including those with a specific dollar limit, are so valuable relative to the assets of
the debtor as to be effectively unlimited. 
An additional complication is that the exemption often depends on the characteristics of
the debtor.  For example, some states allow married debtors filing jointly to each claim a
homestead exemption while other states do not.  Some states, such as Massachusetts, offer
substantially increased exemptions for senior citizens while other states such as Utah and
Virginia offer exemptions which depend on the number of dependents that a debtor has.  Finally,-8-
as mentioned above, the exemption may depend critically on whether a debtor lives in a rural or
urban area. 
When examining personal property exemptions, the first thing that one will notice, even
before the generosity of some exemptions, is that most states offer exemptions that are highly
specific and complex.   A quick glance at the tangible personal property that can be exempted in
Texas will illustrate this point.  In Texas the debtor may exempt "athletic and sporting
equipment, including bicycles; 2 firearms; home furnishings, including family heirlooms; food;
clothing; jewelry (not to exceed 25% of total exemption); 1 two-, three- or four-wheeled motor
vehicle per member of the family or single adult who holds a driver's license . . .; 2 horses,
mules or donkeys and a saddle, blanket and bridle for each; 12 head of cattle, 60 head of other
types of livestock; 120 fowl; pets and tools, equipment & books to $30,000 total ($60,000 for
head of family) (Elias, Renauer and Leonard (1995)).  With all of this incredible specificity, the
personal property exemption is substantially more difficult to quantify than the homestead
exemption.
Because of these complications, one cannot develop a “correct” method of coding
property exemptions, a situation reflected by the fact that, to our knowledge, no two papers in
this area employ the same method.  Indeed, GSW themselves use one measure of exemptions
when studying the probability that an individual will be denied credit and a different measure
when studying the effect on the quantity of credit and the interest rate.  Acknowledging the
potential for subjectivity, we employ multiple coding methods to insure that our results are not
sensitive to the specification chosen. 
The difficulties in coding the exemptions are most severe with the personal property
exemptions.  Many states place no dollar limit on the amount of some forms of personal property
that may be exempted but instead rely on words such as “necessary.”  If one extends GSW’s
assumption of fungibility to include items such as clothes, furniture or automobiles, many statesAs discussed above, our premise is not that pre-bankruptcy
9
planning is impossible or unimportant.  Indeed, one commonly
cited form of planning, paying down the mortgage, may benefit the
mortgage lender.
-9-
will erroneously be seen as providing “unlimited” bankruptcy exemptions.  If one ignores
exemptions of specific property and focuses solely on the ability to exempt cash, one will
overstate the relative generosity of states that rely heavily on the wildcard exemption.  One could
specify dollar values for what is “necessary,” but this raises serious questions about the source of
the values chosen.  Indeed, the exemptions may be designed to prevent the store of wealth and
make resale difficult.
3b. Bankruptcy Planning
Bankruptcy planning does take place.  However, we stress that such planning is limited
and that many debtors are unable to fully utilize the exemptions as provided by law.   There are
9
both legal and practical reasons for this.  First, while creditors may unwittingly lend some
money to debtors in financial distress, they are unlikely to grant such debtors unlimited credit. 
Second, there are several provisions of the bankruptcy code designed to prevent abuse of the
system which, although not perfect, probably have a real effect on the ability of a debtor to
“plan” for bankruptcy.  The provisions we discuss below prevent a debtor from accumulating
enough assets to maximize the exemptions and prevent a debtor from converting all of the assets
that he does have into exempt form.  
If a court finds behavior which suggests that the debtor has borrowed with no intention of
ever repaying, as suggested by GSW, the courts may deny the bankruptcy petition on the
grounds that it was fraudulent (Section 727) or a "substantial abuse" (Section 707(b)) of the
system.  Charging one's credit cards to the limit to obtain exempt assets is not necessarily a wise
strategy either as debts incurred when there is no possibility to repay are non-dischargeable. In California, the exemption includes personal effects
10
that are "ordinarily and reasonably necessary to, and personally
used or procured for use by" the debtor or his family. Further,
if an item has "extraordinary value" relative to that deemed
necessary, the court can order the item sold and allow the debtor
the "reasonable" portion of the proceeds.
For related research, see Sieger, Vadner and Watkins
11
(1994).
As of 1981, the median asset value of bankrupt debtors in
12
Illinois, Texas and Pennsylvania was $14,000.  In all three of
these states, a couple in bankruptcy could have exempted more
than this amount in the homestead alone (Sullivan, Warren and
Westbrook (1989)).
-10-
Some credit card companies make use of this provision by routinely examining the bankruptcy
filings of their debtors to determine the date of insolvency.  They then challenge all debts
incurred after this date (Elias, Renauer and Leonard (1995)).  When they do challenge a debt, the
banks have a fairly high success rate, between 38% and 48% (Installment Credit Report (1992)).  
Both the provisions of the code that are designed to prevent "abuse" of the bankruptcy
process and the design of the exemptions themselves work to prevent many debtors from
reaching the dollar limit of each form of exempt property.  That is, many exemptions explicitly
give judges discretion over what the debtor is entitled to keep in order to prevent the debtor from
using exempt property as a store of wealth.  For example, exemptions which relate to common
forms of personal property generally require that the exempt property be "reasonably necessary"
for the debtor's livelihood or that the property be for the actual use of the debtor.    Finally, a
10
debtor's attempt to use the exemptions to store wealth in liquid assets can result in a denial of the
exemption or even a denial of the discharge if the court feels that this was indicative of an
attempt to "hinder, delay or defraud a creditor" (In re Armstrong, 97 B.R. 569, 570 (Bankr. Neb.
1989), aff’d 931 F.2d 1233, (8th Cir. 1991)).
11
The vast majority of debtors do not maximize the theoretical exemption.   The fact that
12-11-
many debtors who would apparently gain from these strategies neither file nor default, appear to
suggest that the anti-abuse provisions are to some extent effective. This may help to explain the
findings of White and Petropolous (1996) who note that far more bankruptcies should be
observed given the nominal exemptions levels.
3c. Other Consumer Credit Laws and Regulations
It is important to remember that the mortgage creditor retains the right to foreclose if he
is not repaid in full; the mortgage is senior to the exemption with respect to the home. 
Moreover, the mortgage creditor is immune to several bankruptcy provisions which threaten
other secured creditors or other lien-holders.  For example, unlike other forms of secured credit,
the mortgage is not split into secured and unsecured credit components by Section 506 and thus
a debtor desiring to retain possession of his home must either convince the mortgage creditor to
allow him to reaffirm the debt or pay the mortgage creditor in full.  Likewise, the mortgage
creditor is not affected by Section 1322(b)(2) which allows the debtor to reschedule payments in
Chapter 13 according to a judicially determined interest rate.  Finally, the debtor cannot make
use of the lien avoidance provisions of Section 522(f) for a mortgage contract.
Most of the states which have opted out of the federal exemptions have adopted state
exemptions so generous that it appears a debtor is unlikely to choose the federal exemptions for
reasons other than administrative convenience.  Therefore, it is safe to say that state property
exemptions are the dominant form of exemptions in bankruptcy.  Most of these exemptions
continue to have significance outside of bankruptcy.  Much like their operation in bankruptcy, a
general creditor may only seize a debtor’s property if the debtor has non-exempt equity in that
asset.   Again like bankruptcy, the exemptions do not affect the right of a mortgagee to seize his
collateral if he is not repaid in full.  Although the exemptions protect the debtor’s assets equallySome exemptions protect the proceeds from a sale of exempt
13
property for a period in order to allow the debtor to convert the
proceeds into another form of exempt property.   See, for
example, HI Rev Stat 36-651-96.
If omitted legal variables changed at the same time as the
14
exemptions levels, our results would be biased.  At least for
wage garnishment laws, however, we know that almost no changes
took place during our sample period.
-12-
whether or not he has filed, their value is enhanced by the discharge available in bankruptcy and
the lien avoidance provisions of Section 522(f).   In the absence of bankruptcy, the debtors assets
are only protected so long as they remain in exempt form.  
13
Property exemptions are but one part of debtor/creditor law.  Just as the exemptions vary
across states, there is a fair amount of state-level variation in other aspects of the law which
could directly affect the price and quantity of credit.  A few examples will illustrate this
problem.  Until 1997, Texas all but prohibited second mortgages through the very same statutes
which create the exemptions.   California prohibits mortgage lenders from seeking recourse
against their debtors if foreclosure fails to generate sufficient assets to satisfy the debt.  Several
other states allow a debtor (or junior creditor) to redeem the home even after it has been sold at
an auction.  In addition, the states have adopted varying restrictions on the ability of a creditor to
garnish his debtors wages.
While the above statutes could be used to form additional legal variables, they are
beyond the scope of this paper.  Rather than attempt to specify all legal and cultural variables
that might affect the credit market, we rely on the use of cross-sectional and time series variation
to control for some of these unmeasured effects.
14
For all of the reasons discussed above, we believe that the effect of the exemptions on the
demand for mortgages is likely to be limited.  To the extent that property exemptions do affect-13-
the market for home mortgage loans, we expect the effect to change the supply of mortgages. 
We readily admit that we cannot rule out the possibility of a demand shift.  However, we think
that this is unlikely to cloud the results or three important reasons.  First, the vast majority of
debtors are unaware of the magnitude of their state’s exemption at the time of borrowing. 
Although they may learn of the exemption after they enter into a time of financial distress, very
few will know their state’s exemption or even contemplate its use at the time that they borrow. 
Second, if capital is mobile across states so that supply is flat in any one state, demand shifts will
not affect equilibrium terms of credit unless the type of debtor changes.  Finally, even if a
demand shift changes the type of debtors who apply for a loan, the HMDA data set provides
detailed information on the individuals who apply for the loan ad we are able to control for this
potential problem to a certain extent.
4.  Exemptions and the Supply of Credit
Before providing a more detailed analysis of the effect of the exemptions on the supply
of home mortgage loans, we reiterate the basic thrust of this paper; exemptions are unlikely to
have a significantly negative impact on the supply of home mortgage loans precisely because of
their status as a secured loan.  This can be most clearly seen by examining a world with no
transactions costs.  The mortgage creditor should be completely indifferent toward the
homestead exemption as it will not affect his right to foreclose on the home if not paid in full. 
While somewhat obvious, we believe that this point has been overlooked in the literature and has
important empirical implications.  The mortgage lender might take a negative view of other
exemptions (personal property).  This is so because, if the mortgage lender cannot fully satisfy
her claim by seizing the house, she would like to go after personal property.  Large personal
property exemptions prevent this.  Note, however, that this effect is only important if the home
mortgage lender is significantly undersecured.  As noted in the introduction, empirical evidence-14-
suggests that large shortfalls are atypical.
We now consider the presence of transaction costs to determine if there are secondary
effects which alter the analysis.  Specifically, assume that the home mortgage lender will incur
some non-reimbursable costs if there is a forced sale of the debtor’s home.  Larger exemptions
may induce the debtor to choose to file for bankruptcy and default on his unsecured loans
thereby increasing the debtor’s wealth.  In addition, a larger homestead exemption may reduce
the required repayment in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy again leading to a wealth effect.  This wealth
effect may prevent a default and save the lender the non-reimbursable costs.  Larger homestead
exemptions may also induce the debtor to choose Chapter 7 over Chapter 13.  We argue below
that Chapter 7 is likely to pose lower costs for the home mortgage lender.  A larger homestead
exemption will make it less likely that there will be a foreclosure sale.
Larger personal property exemptions may also have a beneficial effect because of the
wealth effect.  That is, if a debtor reaffirms the mortgage, the mortgage holder benefits from
larger exemptions as they make the debtor wealthier and hence better able to continue to meet
the payments.  However, this must be balanced against the effect on the deficiency judgment and
the debtor’s incentives to engage in pre-bankruptcy planning; the mortgage creditor may prefer
the debtor to have a large homestead exemption and small personal property exemption to
encourage him to repay his mortgage before filing for bankruptcy.  Therefore, the effect of the
personal property exemptions is theoretically uncertain.
To evaluate these potential effects more explicitly, we employ a framework in which we
first focus on the debtor’s choices of whether or not to repay his loans and whether or not to file
for bankruptcy.  Once this is specified we focus on the return to the mortgage lender.
4a. The Debtor’s Decision
Although the majority of papers addressing property exemptions have focused on theWe do not consider the choice of defaulting on the
15
mortgage and repaying the unsecured loans.  Because we assume
that the mortgage lender has the right to a deficiency judgment,
he has the right to be treated equally as the unsecured
creditors.
Some state exemptions allow attachment of the debtor’s property even though they do
16
not allow foreclosure and sale of the property.  For example, Section 41.001 of the Texas
Property Code only explicitly prohibits the “seizure [of a homestead] for the claims of creditors.” 
This language has resulted in some ambiguity.  Some courts have held that no lien can attach the
homestead.  Hoffman v. Love, 494 S.W.2d 591, 593-94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), writ ref’d
n.r.e. per curiam 499 S.W.2d (Tex. 1973); Harms v. Ehlers, 179 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1944, writ ref’d).  However, other, more  recent, cases have found that an
unenforceable lien attaches.  See  Exocet, Inc. v. Cordes, 815 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. App.- Austin
1991, no writ.)  These liens may, however, “place a cloud on the debtor’s title” and thus are
avoidable in bankruptcy.”  In re Henderson, 18 F.3d 1305, 1310-11 (5  Cir. 1994).
th
-15-
filing decision, no clear model of the debtor’s filing decision has emerged.  While we do not
seek to fill this void here, we do need to address the issue in order to examine the effect of the
exemptions on the return of the secured creditor.  We assume that the debtor will have four
general alternatives:  repay all of  his creditors in full, default on his unsecured loans and force
the creditors to use state collections proceedings, file under Chapter 7 or file under Chapter 13 of
the bankruptcy code.    We assume throughout that the debtor may only keep his home if he
15
repays his mortgage creditor in full; the mortgage creditor will not renegotiate the mortgage.
There are several reasons why the probability of filing for bankruptcy should depend on
the exemptions.  First, the exemptions may be larger in bankruptcy than in simple default. For
example, some states allow filers to use the federal bankruptcy exemptions which may be  larger
than the state exemptions.  In addition, some states, such as California have state exemptions that
apply only in bankruptcy.  More importantly, bankruptcy permanently discharges debts and
avoids certain liens.  As a result, after bankruptcy the debtor is able to convert his exempt wealth
into any form he likes without fear of seizure by creditors.  He will no longer have to fear
attachment by general creditors and those liens which were attached before bankruptcy.   Rather
16The federal garnishment exemption is the greater of 75% or
17
thirty times the minimum wage per week. 
-16-
than trying to be more explicit about the decision to file, we assume that the debtor will file with
some probability that depends on the level of garnishment permitted, the exemptions, the value
of his home and the value of his human capital, b(g, X , X , h, k), where g is the fraction of h   P
future income which is exempt from garnishment, X  and X  are the homestead and personal h    P
property exemptions,  h is the value of the house and k is the debtor’s human capital
(equivalently, future income).   Note that some of the anti-abuse provisions of the bankruptcy
17
code may deny the debtor access to bankruptcy.  In these circumstances the probability of filing
is simply zero.
To simplify notation, throughout the discussion we assume that the personal property
exemption is binding, P>X , where P is personal property.  The distressed debtor’s exempt P
personal property is thus always equal to X .  This assumption has no effect on the model’s P
implications for changes in X .  However, without this assumption, marginal changes to X  may h                  P
have zero effect on the lender. 
Default outside Bankruptcy
Consider a debtor who decides not to repay his unsecured creditors but does not file for
bankruptcy.  His unsecured creditors (including the mortgage creditor if there is a deficiency
judgment) will have the right to garnish his wages and seize any non-exempt property in
satisfaction of their debt.  In order to retain his home, the home equity (plus subjective value)
must be worth more than the debt but not so valuable that the equity exceeds X .  If the equity h
exceeds X , any creditor can demand the excess equity and thereby force a sale of the house.  If h
the value of the home (including the subjective value) is less than the value of the mortgage, a
debtor defaulting on his unsecured debt would have no reason to repay his mortgage.  That is, he-17-
will retain his home if M-v<h<M+X , and gk+X >M, where v is the subjective value of the h     P
home and M is the amount of the mortgage loan. 
Chapter 7
Now consider a debtor filing under Chapter 7.  The mortgage creditor must be repaid in
full if the debtor is to retain the home.  The debtor may only do so if he has sufficient assets,
other than the home, to repay the debt in full, k+X >M.  By filing for bankruptcy the debtor has P
more wealth available for repayment as he is no longer subject to garnishment or the other
pressures that the unsecured creditors can place on a delinquent debtor.  As with simple default,
the equity must be enough to make reaffirming the mortgage rational but not so much that it
exceeds the exemption, M-v<h<M+X .  If both of these conditions are met, the debtor’s h
consumption is X +h-M+v+k-T  where T   represents the debtor’s transactions costs in Chapter P 7    7
7.  If one of these conditions is not met, the debtor will lose his home in a chapter 7 bankruptcy
and his wealth will be X +Min[X , h-M]+k-T P h   7.
The transactions costs of Chapter 7 are likely to be much different than those of default
outside of bankruptcy and their size is likely to depend on the individual characteristics of the
debtor and the community in which he lives.  The debtor will have to pay a filing fee and may
need to hire a lawyer.  In addition, the debtor may face an additional stigma beyond what he
would have faced had he simply defaulted.  However, the automatic stay will protect the debtor
from unwanted collections calls and the anti-discrimination provision of Section 525 may
provide some comfort as well.  From a theoretical level it is unclear whether a bankruptcy
appears worse or better on the debtor’s credit record than default in the absence of bankruptcy. 
If a debtor files for Chapter 7 he will be unable to do so again for six years.  This has lead someFor example, Frank (1996) reports,  “Prof. Warren says some credit-card issuers
18
actually review bankruptcy filings in search of potential customers.  Their logic is simple:  the
law doesn’t allow people to file for [a Chapter 7] bankruptcy more than once every six years. 
Thus, the recently bankrupt are, in some sense, perfect debtors – they can’t just walk away from
their debts.”
Collier’s 1325-53, 1325.08[4](b) citing In re Tinneberg, 59 B.R. 634 (Bankr. E.D. NY
19
1986); In re Hedges, 68 B.R. 18 (Bankr. E.D. VA. 1986).
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scholars to assert that bankrupt debtors are good credit risks.   However, a bankruptcy filing
18
may signal a greater willingness to default.
Chapter 13
The debtor may also file for bankruptcy under Chapter 13.  Under Chapter 13 the debtor
is permitted to retain all of his physical assets, including his non-exempt property, but must in
return pay some of his future earnings.  Two important considerations arise.  First, the creditors
must receive at least as much as they would have received in a Chapter 7 filing.  Therefore the
debtor must pay at least (P-X )+Max[0, h-M-X ] to his unsecured creditors.   Second, the debtor P   h
must pay all of his “disposable income.”  This second provision may be less strict than it would
appear.  Basically, this provision provides that the debtor’s budget may not contain “luxuries
unavailable to the average American.”   We will assume that the additional amount depends on
19
the value of his future earnings, R (k).   13
As always, the mortgage creditor must be repaid if the debtor is to keep the home.  In
addition, the unsecured creditors can seize the home if the debtor does not pledge sufficient
income to offset any non-exempt equity.  Therefore, in order to retain the home the debtor must
repay at least P-X + Max[M, h-X ]+R (k).  P     h 13
The foregoing discussion suggests one immediate conclusion.  The debtor will always
have to make greater payments in Chapter 13 than in Chapter 7.  Therefore, assuming that theElias, Renauer and Leonard (1995) describe delays on the
20
order of an additional month.
-19-
transactions costs of Chapter 13 are at least as high as Chapter 7, a debtor would only file under
Chapter 13 if, by doing so, he can keep his house.  This occurs when his equity position is above
the legal exemption and his future income is high enough to meet the Chapter 13 payments, 
h>M+X  and k>h-X -X +R . h    h P 13
Repayment
If the debtor repays his unsecured creditors his return is simply h+v+k-U-M.  Given the
above, it is clear that his filing decision will depend on the value of his home, his human capital,
the exemptions, the garnishment limitation and the relative tranasactions costs.  We define K (h, d
X X , g, R ) as the level of human capital above which the debtor will repay his creditors in h,  P,     13
full.
4b. The Return to Mortgage Lender
In a world without transactions costs, the size of the homestead exemption would have no
effect on the return to the home mortgage lender.  The home mortgage lender is senior to the
exemption.  However, a mortgage creditor is likely to face non-trivial transactions costs when
dealing with distressed debtors.  We consider three distinct forms of transactions costs.  The first
are foreclosure costs such as lawyers fees and running an auction.  The creditor is entitled to
reimbursement for these costs from the proceeds of the sale and we denote these costs Q  when 7
foreclosure occurs in Chapter 7 and Q  when it occurs outside of bankruptcy.   It is likely that Q n                        7
<Q  .  It is true that bankruptcy may delay foreclosure.  However, this delay is unlikely to be n
long and a fully secured mortgage lender is entitled to interest payments.   Some have asserted
20
that bankruptcy provides a better system for foreclosure and sale.  -20-
For example, Lopucki (1991) argues that bankruptcy provides better mechanisms for
gaining information on the debtor in order to determine whether to foreclose, makes it easier to
prevent abuse of the property, allows for liquidation free and clear of other liens, cuts-off the
“right of redemption” (which allows the debtor to make good on the mortgage for up to 6
months), and allows the lender to  bypass state anti-deficiency legislation.  In addition, the
debtor has an incentive to comply with the legal proceedings in order to secure his discharge.
Even in the absence of a foreclosure, these costs within bankruptcy are not likely to be
much higher than under state collections proceedings.  The debtor has chosen to reaffirm the
debt and will make the payments on a regular schedule.  Therefore, the mortgage creditor need
not participate heavily in the process.  In fact, many debtors do not even list their mortgage
creditor making their participation completely unnecessary (e.g., Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook (1989))
Other significant non-reimbursable costs are those associated with continuing a debt
contract with a distressed debtor.  These costs are taken to be inversely proportional to wealth. 
The costs incurred by the mortgage lender are summarized in the first row of Table 1.  Unless
the relationship with the debtor is ended through foreclosure, costs are a function of the debtor’s
wealth.
Rows 2-4 of Table 1 show the returns to the lender from mortgage payments, foreclosure
sales and from deficiency judgements (when the debt cannot be covered by sale of the home).  
The mortgage lender gets a fraction of the debtor’s property from a deficiency judgement; the
fraction is equal to the housing debt divided by total debt.  The bottom row indicates the net
return for each possible debtor action, with F (h) and F (h) denoting the returns from foreclosure 7     n
and deficiency.
As mentioned above, we allow the debtor’s decision to repay all of his debts to depend
on the level of garnishment allowed, the exemptions, the value of his home and the value of his-21-
human capital.  Full repayment will occur when k>K (g,X ,X ,h). d p h .
Given this accounting framework, we can write an explicit expression for the expected
return from a mortgage conditional on the probability densities of future home and human
capital values.  Let the expected return, detailed in the appendix, be denoted E(R).
In order to determine the effect of an increase in the homestead exemption, we need only
evaluate the sign of the derivative of the return with respect to X .  First we make the following h
assumptions about the magnitude of relative transactions costs.
Assumption 1
Foreclosure is less costly under court supervision, C <C . 7f  nf
Assumption 2
Reaffirmed mortgages are less costly than foreclosures, C <C , C <C C <C and C <C . 13  nf   13  7f  ,  7r  7f    nr  nf
Assumption 3
Mortgage lenders prefer that the debtor file under Chapter 13 and thereby partially discharge the
unsecured debt rather than repay the unsecured debt in full, C <C.  13  r
Assumption 4
Debtors with non-exempt equity in their home and a relatively high value of human capital are
likely to file under Chapter 13 to avoid foreclosure; b(g, X , X , h, k) is close to one in this h   P
region.
Assumption 3 is reasonable in that any discharge increases the wealth of the mortgage
holder.  Assumption 4 asserts that debtors who face good job prospects, but are unable to meet
all their current debt payments, are likely to file Chapter 13 in order to keep their houses.  As








Under assumptions 1-4, the expected mortgage return to the lender is increasing in the




Under assumptions 1-4, the effect of marginal increases in personal property exemptions
are theoretically ambiguous.   Specifically, they will depend on the relative magnitudes of the
beneficial wealth effect on the debtor versus the detrimental effect of the decreased ability to




Proposition 1 immediately suggests a correlation between homestead exemptions and
favorable supply conditions.  Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Longhofer (1996), and
Williamson (1986, 1987), we note that a shift in the supply of credit may manifest itself in
reduced credit rationing or lower interest rates.  Intuitively, changes to the interest rate may not
necessarily clear the market because they have effects on the type of loan and the probability of
repayment.  For example, higher interest rates will 1) decrease the ability of a given debtor to
repay; 2) change the pool of applicants by decreasing the number of high quality applicants and
3) cause some debtors to engage in riskier behavior.  Longhofer (1996) explicitly examines the
effect of exemptions on the probability of denial in a costly state verification model.  He shows
that if one considers credit generally, larger exemptions should lead to greater credit rationing asyit’"i%$1Xh,it%$2Xp,it%(Zit%git, yit’(0,1),
-23-
the creditors cannot make up for the reduced return in default by increasing the interest rate.
This result is not robust to the inclusion of secured credit.  It is unlikely that homestead
exemptions will reduce the return to the mortgage lender when the debtor is in financial distress. 
Indeed, proposition 1 implies that larger homestead exemptions should lead to lower interest
rates and reduced credit rationing.  However, it is possible that personal property exemptions
will increase credit rationing.
5. Empirical Tests and Results
We first investigate whether the probability of being denied credit, in the form of a
mortgage, is increasing in the homestead or personal property exemption level.  The Home
Mortgage Discrimination Act (HMDA) data contains a summary of every mortgage application
taken by qualifying mortgage lenders in the United States from 1990-1995.  Because of the
enormity of this data set (about 3.8 million in 1995 alone), we select a random subset of
approximately 100,000 applications per year.  Each application contains information on the type
of loan (conventional, FHA or VA), the purpose of the loan, the outcome (approved, denied or
incomplete), as well as the race, gender and location of applicant and any co-applicants.  We
exclude FHA, VA and Farmers’ Home Administration loans.  We also exclude home
improvement loans.  Each application includes the income, race, sex, and state of residence of
the applicant and co-applicant (if any) as well as the size of the loan requested and the decision
of whether the application was accepted or rejected. 
We study probability of denial by estimating a logit regression of the form:
where y  =1 for denied and 0 for approved.  Z  is a vector of individual characteristics including it                 it
the loan-to-income ratio, race, marital status, income, income squared, as well as the stateNumerous states have unlimited exemptions for wedding and
21
engagement rings.
The results in this paper were not sensitive to
22
alternative ceilings such as two million dollars.
-24-
unemployment rate as a proxy for regional business cycle conditions (taken from the Selective
Access Service of the Bureau of Labor Statistics).
We assume that the exemption of interest is that available to a debtor who does not
qualify for special treatment due to age, infirmity, veteran’s status or occupation.  Because our
analysis predicts that the homestead and personal property exemptions may have very different
implications, we construct two measures.  First, we construct a measure of the homestead
exemption which includes the amount of equity a debtor may exempt as well as any wildcard
exemption which may be used on the home.  We ignore any limitations on the lot size.  This
measure is relatively straightforward to calculate.  In addition, we construct a measure for the
personal property exemptions which again includes any wildcard exemption as well as the equity
in a car that a debtor may exempt and the amount of jewels that a debtor may keep other than
wedding and engagement rings.   Perhaps surprisingly, the two exemptions categories are
21
statistically uncorrelated, with a point estimate of -0.05.
Given this data, we construct both continuous and dummy variables.  If a state has an
“unlimited” exemption, we set the exemption variable equal to one million dollars in the
continuous analysis.   We express the continuous variables in units of $100,000.  Our second
22
approach, following GSW, is to group the exemption levels into quartiles with the fourth quartile
containing only those states with unlimited exemptions.
We do not make the dubious assumption -- implicit in pooled regressions -- that there are
no systematic differences in credit denials, except those related to the regressors.  Because states
are likely to experience other differential influences (e.g., cultural and legal), we estimate a-25-
fixed-effects model which allows the intercept to vary across states (at the cost of a reduction in
degrees of freedom).  Therefore, our results are driven by the effects of changes in the state
exemptions.  Such changes were not uncommon over our sample period.
Table 2 presents maximum likelihood estimates based on the continuous specification of
the homestead exemption.  Columns 2 to 4 show the coefficients, standard errors and p-values
allowing for fixed state effects.  The coefficients on the fixed state effects are omitted from the
table.  The fifth column of the table, labeled standardized estimate, reports the coefficient
estimate normalized by the variance.  
As predicted by proposition 1, the coefficient on the homestead exemption is
significantly negative.  The signs of the coefficients associated with the other variables are
consistent with what we would expect.  The probability of denial appears to decrease with higher
incomes, and increases for higher state unemployment rates and larger loan requests.  African-
american applicants appear to have a higher probability of denial, as do single applicants.  The
dummy variable for female applicants should be interpreted with caution as this indicates only
that the primary applicant was female.  Four of five annual dummies are significantly different
from zero, suggesting that the overall probability of denial changes markedly from year to year.
Table 3 shows the results based on grouping the homestead exemption into quartiles. 
Again, the quartiles take the expected negative sign implying that larger exemptions lead to a
lower probability of denial as the mortgage lenders prefer large homestead exemptions.  
In Table 4, we include the personal property exemption in addition to the continuous
homestead.  The coefficient on the homestead exemption is little altered, remaining significantly
negative.  However, the personal property exemptions are positively correlated with the
probability of denial, although only at a significance level of 75%.
It is possible that the negative coefficient on the homestead exemption is a result of




may choose lower exemptions.  Nevertheless, even if this interpretation were accurate, any
negative effect that the homestead exemption has on the supply of mortgages is insufficient to
overcome the effect of this bias.
We also examine whether, as we have suggested, large bankruptcy exemptions tend to
drive down mortgage rates (presumably by encouraging supply).  We use annual mortgage rates
available to borrowers in each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia.  These data are
taken from Rates & Terms on Conventional Home Mortgages, 1995 compiled by the Federal
Housing Finance Board. 
The coefficient estimates from fixed-effects panel regressions are shown in Tables 5. 
The top panel of Table 5 reports coefficient estimates from a fixed-effects panel data regression
of mortgage rates on the homestead exemption, the unemployment rate and average hourly wage
rate from the Selective Access Service, annual dummies and the two demographic variables,
percentage African-american and percentage senior citizen.   Consistent with our hypothesis
23
that supply has increased, the homestead exemption variable enters negatively with a t-statistic
of -1.5 or a confidence level of about 87%.  Personal property exemption enter insignificantly. 
An F-test of the joint significance of the random effects indicates a p-value of .00, suggesting
strong evidence in favor of differential state effects.  In addition, we calculated the Hausman
(1978) specification test of random effects model against the alternative of the fixed-effects
model.  The associated p-value is .52 which indicates no evidence in favor of either.
The lower panel of Table 5 replicates the analysis for the loan-to-value ratio.  Although
not significant, it is interesting to note that the coefficient on the personal property exemption is
-1.1.  This is consistent with the estimation of the probability of denial; it is plausible that the
personal property exemptions reduce the supply of mortgage loans.Income levels are defined as less than $24,999, between
24
$25,000 and $49,999, and more than $50,000.  Each income category
contains roughly one third of U.S. families.
-27-
Quite apart from whether bankruptcy exemptions exert a statistically significant effect on
credit conditions, are they economically important?  Table 6 presents fitted values from the logit
regression for typical debtors in four states.  The middle panel shows estimated probabilities of
denial for white, married consumers in low, middle and high income brackets  and median loan-
to-income ratios in 1995.   South Carolina and Delaware are shown in columns 4 and 5. 
24
Delaware’s exemptions are about twice that of South Carolina.  At the same time, the implied
probability of denial for South Carolinians is 10% to 15% higher -- a substantial difference. 
Column 6 shows fitted values for West Virginia which has higher homestead and personal
property exemptions compared to Delaware.  Given our estimates, denial is noticeably more
likely in West Virginia than in Delaware for each income bracket.  In Mississippi which allows a
homestead exemption ten times that of West Virginia, we estimate that denial is over 10% less
likely.  Of course, these differences cannot be solely attributed to the exemption levels.  The
predicted state denial rates condition on fixed state effects which may reflect other cultural and
legal variables.
In order to focus on the importance of exemptions in isolation, the bottom panel of Table
6 reports the percentage difference that would be predicted from quadrupling either the
homestead or personal property exemption.  Clearly, the economic impact from increasing the
homestead exemption is small in states with currently small exemptions.   This becomes
especially apparent when compared to the estimated increase in the probability of denial from
quadrupling personal property exemptions.
Turning to mortgage rates, Table 7 shows estimated terms on fixed rate mortgages
typical consumers in the same four states.  Again the lower panel displays the implied-28-
percentage change in the dependent variables that would result from quadrupling either
exemption category.  As with denial rates, large increases to the homestead exemption imply
relatively small changes, less than 1%, of mortgage rates and down payments.  A fourfold
increase in personal property exemptions, yields mortgage rate and down payment increases in
the range of 1 to 5 percent.  However, it should be noted that the loan-to-value ratio regressions
indicated that these changes are not statistically significant.
On balance, the changes in exemption levels are associated with relatively small changes
in the probability of denial and mortgage rates.  Nevertheless, these results confirm the essential
theme we have outlined -- the mortgage lender is unlikely to be adversely affected by a large
homestead exemption.
6. Conclusion
Existing research into bankruptcy property exemptions has found significant adverse
consequences for consumer credit markets, raising interest rates and reducing access to credit. 
We find that these results do not hold for the homestead exemption and the mortgage loan
market.  Indeed, the probability of being turned down on a mortgage application appears to be
marginally reduced as homestead exemption levels increase.  In addition, mortgage rates appear
to decline with higher homestead exemption levels.  The results are reversed if one considers the
personal property exemptions.
The discrepancy between the results of our paper and those of the previous research may
result from the important differences between secured and unsecured credit.  More research is
necessary to determine the effects of property exemptions on purely unsecured and undersecured
credit.  Such research is particularly needed in light of the recent renewed calls for standardized
federal bankruptcy exemptions.
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission conducts a periodic review of the-29-
bankruptcy process creating the possibility that academic research could lead to significant
reform.  Despite the apparent need for research on personal bankruptcy, the number of academic
papers on this topic is quite limited when compared to the literature on its more seductive
cousin, the Chapter 11 reorganization.   We hope that this paper, to our knowledge the first to
study the effects of personal bankruptcy on mortgages, motivates additional research in this area.-30-
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Returns to the Mortgage Lender
         Debtor    
     Action
Return to  
Lender     
Chapter 7 No Filing Chapter 7 No Filing Chapter 13 Full
Foreclosure Foreclosure Reaffirm Reaffirm Repayment
Costs C C C (k+X -M) C (gk+X -M) C (k+X C(k-U-M) 7f nf 7r P NR P 13 h
+X -h-R ) P 13
r
Mortgage M M M M
Return
Foreclosure Min[h, M+Q  ]-Q   Min[h, M+Q  ]-Q  
Return
7  7 n  n
Deficiency  (P-X ) ((1-g)k+P-X )
Judgement Max[M+Q  -h, 0] Max[M+Q  -h, 0]
P
7




Net Return  F (h)-C F (h)-C M- M- M- M- 7 7f n nf
C (k+X -M) C ((1-g)k+X -M) C (k+X +X -h-R ) C(k+P-U-M) 7r P nr P 13 P h 13 r
Notes: Gross and net returns to the mortgage lender as a function of debtor action.  See text for
details.Table 2.  The Probability of Being Denied Credit and the Homestead Exemption
  Parameter  Standard    Wald                     Standardized
Variable   Estimate Error    Chi-Square   P-Value       Estimate   
Constant -1.5742 0.1877 70.300 0.0001  . 
Exemption -0.0320 0.0001 13.019 0.0003 -0.05907
Loan-to-Income Ratio 0.0020 0.0008 6.5428 0.0105 0.01356
Year91 0.1183 0.0196 36.562 0.0001 0.02025
Year92 -0.0737 0.0179 16.890 0.0001 0.01625
Year93 -0.2096 0.0178 139.32 0.0001 -0.05116
Year94 0.0218 0.0185 1.4004 0.2367 0.00463
Year95 0.2854 0.0179 252.85 0.0001 0.05807
Income -0.3310 0.0001 1282.4 0.0001 -0.26603
Income Squared 3.6e-05 0.0001 1079.5 0.0001 0.18689
Dummy for African-American 0.7129 0.0176 1646.7 0.0001 0.07932
Dummy for Female -0.0290 0.0122 5.6705 0.0173 -0.00601
Dummy for Single 0.2783 0.0105 700.56 0.0001 0.06775
Unemployment 0.8114 0.3312 6.0012 0.0143 0.00712
Observations: 433,699     
Denied:          66,011
Approved:     367,688
Model Fitting Information and Testing Global Null Hypothesis BETA=0
 Concordant Pairs =  63.7%         
 Discordant Pairs  =  35.4%         
 Tied Pairs          =   0.9%           
                              
                    
 LR Test for Regressors:           13392.76 (p=0.0001)
Notes: Table 2 presents binary logit estimates for the probability of being turned down on a
mortgage application.  The data are taken from the Home Mortgage Discrimination Act database
for 1990-1995.  Exemption quartiles are dummy variables which represent the size of the
homestead exemption available in the relevant state.  A pair of observations is defined as
concordant (discordant) if the observation with the larger (smaller) response has a larger
predicted probability.  LR test indicates the chi-square statistic for joint significance of all
regressors.  Standardized estimates are normalized by the sample standard deviation of the
associated regressor.
Table 3.  The Probability of Being Denied Credit and the Homestead Exemption                                     Parameter Standard     Wald                   Standardized
 Variable                          Estimate    Error     Chi-Square  P-Value   Estimate   
Constant -1.4643 0.1902 59.242 0.0001 .    
2  quartile exemption -0.1039 0.0283 13.513 0.0002 -0.0247
nd
3  quartile exemption -0.2053 0.0481 18.208 0.0001 -0.0529
rd
4  quartile exemption -0.1658 0.0716 5.3588 0.0206 -0.0323
th
Loan-to-Income ratio 0.0020 0.0008 6.5348 0.0106 0.0135
Year91 0.1200 0.0196 37.601 0.0001 0.0205
Year92 -0.0734 0.0179 16.733 0.0001 -0.0161
Year93 -0.2100 0.0178 139.65 0.0001 -0.0512
Year94 0.0227 0.0185 1.5028 0.2202 0.0048
Year95 0.2864 0.0180 254.19 0.0001 0.0582
Income -0.3331 0.0001 1282.0 0.0001 -0.2659
Income squared 3.6e-05 0.0001 1079.8 0.0001 0.1868
Dummy for African-American 0.7126 0.0176 1645.4 0.0001 0.0792
Dummy for female -0.0287 0.0122 5.5750 0.0182 -0.0059
Dummy for single 0.2828 0.0105 731.77 0.0001 0.0688
Unemployment 0.5638 0.3337 2.8548 0.0911 0.0049
    Model Fitting Information and Testing Global Null Hypothesis BETA=0
  Concordant Pairs = 63.7%          
  Discordant  Pairs = 35.4%         
  Tied Pairs          =  0.9%          
LR Test of Regressors:          13121.96 (p=0.0001)
Notes: Table 3 presents binary logit estimates for the probability of being turned down on a
mortgage application.  Exemption refers to the homestead exemption available in bankruptcy in
the relevant state.  A pair of observations is defined as concordant (discordant) if the observation
with the larger (smaller) response has a larger predicted probability.  LR test indicates the chi-
square statistic for joint significance of all regressors.
Table 4.  The Probability of Being Denied Credit 
Homestead and Property Exemptions                                      Parameter Standard    Wald                  Standardized
 Variable                           Estimate    Error   Chi-Square  P-Value   Estimate   
Constant -1.5803 0.1878 70.771 0.0001 .    
Homestead exemption -0.0321 0.0001 13.271 0.0003 -0.05966
Property exemption 0.1102 0.0010 1.3025 0.2538 0.05957
Loan-Income ratio 0.0020 0.0008 6.5435 0.0105 0.01357
Year91 0.1180 0.0196 36.391 0.0001 0.02021
Year92 -0.0730 0.0179 16.569 0.0001 -0.01611
Year93 -0.2092 0.0178 138.69 0.0001 -0.05106
Year94 0.0219 0.0185 1.4112 0.2349 0.00465
Year95 0.2835 0.0180 247.28 0.0001 0.05768
Income -0.3332 0.0001 1282.4 0.0001 -0.26602
Income squared 3.6e-05 0.0001 1079.9 0.0001 0.18689
Dummy for African-American 0.7131 0.0176 1647.4 0.0001 0.07935
Dummy for female -0.0290 0.0122 5.6848 0.0171 -0.00603
Dummy for single 0.2817 0.0109 665.08 0.0001 0.06857
Unemployment 0.8414 0.3322 0.0860 0.0113  0.07388
    Model Fitting Information and Testing Global Null Hypothesis BETA=0
  Concordant Pairs = 63.7%          
  Discordant  Pairs = 35.4%         
  Tied Pairs          =  0.9%          
LR Test of Regressors:          13111.9 (p=0.0001)
Notes: Table 4 presents binary logit estimates for the probability of being turned down on a
mortgage application.  Exemption refers to the homestead exemption available in bankruptcy in
the relevant state.  A pair of observations is defined as concordant (discordant) if the observation
with the larger (smaller) response has a larger predicted probability.  LR test indicates the chi-
square statistic for joint significance of all regressors.
Table 5.  State-level Fixed Effects Regression Estimates
Homestead Exemptions
                                       Estimated      StandardP2
P
2
Variable                            Coefficient     Error       t-statistic
Mortgage Rates
Homestead exemption -0.036 0.023 -1.542
Property exemption -0.182 0.486 -0.374
Unemployment rate -0.628 0.908 -0.692
Wage rate -0.076 0.059 -1.301
Percent African-American 1.714 5.923 0.289
Percent senior 17.03 8.933 1.906
 Year91 -0.641 0.047 -13.68
 Year92 -1.896 0.056 -33.73
 Year93 -2.769 0.069 -40.05
 Year94 -2.353 0.081 -28.94
 Year95 -1.991 0.094 -21.11
 Std. error of regression  = 0.217
                 R-squared  = 0.964 
     Adjusted R-squared  = 0.956
 F test of A,B=Ai,B:  F(50,244) = 6.259,  P-value = [.000] 
 Hausman test:  (6) = 5.170, P-value = [.522]
Loan-to-Value Ratio
Homestead exemption -0.079 0.267  -0.296
Property exemption -0.636  0.554 -1.147
Unemployment rate -12.14 10.36 -1.172
Wage rate 2.332 0.669 3.487
Percent African-American 11.41 67.57 0.169
Percent senior 325.6 101.9 3.195
 Year91 -0.744 0.534 -1.393
 Year92 -0.631 0.641 -0.984
 Year93 -1.394 0.789 -1.767
 Year94 0.362 0.927 0.391
 Year95 0.112 1.076 0.104
 Std. error of regression = 2.480
                 R-squared = 0.659
     Adjusted R-squared = 0.334
 F test of A,B=Ai,B:  F(50,244) = 4.340,  P-value = [.000]
 Hausman test:  (6) = 32.27,  P-value = [.000]
Notes: Linear regression model estimates of state-level mortgage rates and average mortgage
loan to value ratios.  Hausman (1978) test indicates specification test of random effects model
against the alternative of the fixed effects model. 
Table 6
Probabilities of Denial of a Mortgage Applicationfor Typical Consumers
South Delaware West Mississippi
Carolina  Virginia
Homestead
Exemption 5,000 10,000 15,000 150,000
Personal
Property 5,400 10,000 19,200 20,000
Exemption
Estimated Probabilities
Low Income .224 .208 .222 .199
Middle .211 .195 .209 .187
Income
High Income .146 .134 .144 .128
Estimated Percentage Changes in Probabilities
Quadruple Low Income -0.37 -0.76 -1.12 -11.1
Homestead
Exemption Middle -0.38 -0.77 -1.34 -11.2
Income
High Income -0.41 -0.83 -1.23 -11.9
Quadruple  Low  Income  1.39  2.54  5.02  5.40
Property
Exemption Middle  1.42  2.69  5.11  5.49
Income
High Income  1.54  2.90  5.56  5.91
Notes: Probabilities are fitted values from logit regression results shown in Table 4. Income
levels are defined as less than $24,999, between $25,000 and $49,999 and more than $50,000. 
Each income category contains roughly one third of U.S. families (see Kennickel, Starr-
McCluer and Sunden (1997).  Loan-to-income ratios are set equal to the median values taken
from the 1995 HMDA data for each income level.
Table 7
Rates and Terms of a Mortgage Application
for Typical ConsumersSouth Delaware West Mississippi
Carolina Virginia
Homestead
Exemption  5,000 10,000 15,000 150,000
Personal
Property  5,400 10,000 19,200 20,000
Exemption
Estimated Rates and Terms
Rates 7.79 7.54 7.91 8.23
LTV Ratios 84.3 83.0 79.5 81.0
Estimated Percentage Changes in Rates and Terms
Quadruple Rates -.070 -.144 -.206 -1.97
Homestead
Exemption LTV Ratios -.014 -.029 -.045 -.440
Quadruple  Rates  .377  .722  1.32  1.32
Property
Exemption LTV Ratios -1.24  2.30 -4.61 -4.70
Notes: Mortgage Rates and Loan-to-Value ratios are fitted values from logit regression results
shown in Table 4. Income levels are defined as less than $24,999, between $25,000 and $49,999
and more than $50,000.  Each income category contains roughly one third of U.S. families (see
Kennickel, Starr-McCluer and Sunden (1997).  Loan-to-income ratios are assumed equal to the



















































The Effect of Changes in the Property Exemption
Expected Return on a Mortgage Loan
Let f(h) and j(k) represent the densities of h and k, respectively.  Suppressing the dependence of b on X , p
X , g, h, and k for notational simplicity, the mortgage creditor’s expected return can be now written as h
follows: 
Proof of Proposition 1
By straightforward application of Leibniz’s rule, the derivative of the lender’s expected return, E(R) with







































It remains now to sign the terms of the derivative. We maintain throughout that of b  >0, the probability of Ep
filing is increasing in the exemption.  Assumptions one through three imply that every term from above is
positive save one, (1-b)(F  -M)+C -b C -(1-b)C  .   N  r    13 nf
         The positivity of this term follows from assumption four.  To see this, note that if F <M, (dK /d N   D
X )=0 as the debtor will only consider the homestead exemption if the mortgage creditor is repaid in full h
and he will receive some distribution after foreclosure. Therefore, the sign of this term depends again on the
relative transactions costs.  Becasue C <C, this is positive as long as b is sufficiently close to one.  This 13 r
will hold when v is large relative to R  and T  is small relative to T . QED. 13    13          N
Proof of Proposition 2






















































(22)This unwieldy expression confirms that a change in X  has a much more ambiguous effect. Personal p
property exemptions enhance the debtor’s wealth but also endanger deficiency judgments.  Specifically,
lines 14-16 indicate that larger personal property exemptions increase the chance that the debtor will default
on his unsecured loans.  In addition, a change in X  may now affect the debtor’s willingness to repay his p
loans when the mortgagor is undersecured.  If the debtor chooses to default on the mortgage creditor as
well, the mortgagor will not be repaid in full.  In addition,  a rise in X  will weaken the power of the p
mortgagor to seek a deficiency judgment which is reflected by the fall in D as X  rises. p
         Lines 17-19 represent the effect of a rise in X  to cause more bankruptcies.  As stated when discussing p
a change in the homestead exemption, an increase in bankruptcy filings may be good for the secured
component of the loan through superior foreclosure procedures 
(F >F ) and (C  <C  ) and a greater ability of the debtor to reaffirm the mortgage.  However, bankruptcy  7 n      7f   nf
is bad for the unsecured portion of the loan, if it exists.  That is, D >D  due to a lack of garnishment and an  n  7
increase in X  directly weakens the return to a deficiency judgment. Again, this was not an issue with the p
homestead exemption as a change in X  only has an effect on the debtor’s decision when the mortgage h
creditor is fully secured.  
        Turning to lines 20-22, the personal property exemption increases the total wealth that the debtor has
available to repay his mortgage or repay his unsecured creditors in return for retaining possession of the
home.  As X  rises, foreclosure becomes less likely.  This may be especially important when the mortgage is p
undersecured but the debtor’s private valuation exceeds the mortgage, M-v<h<M+Q.  In this case, a debtor
able to repay results in full repayment while foreclosure may result in a substantial loss.